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INTRODUCTION: FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS VERSUS
THE

GATT

On February 5, 1991, the United States, Canada and Mexico announced their intentions to enter into trilateral negotiations aimed at
creating a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 1 In
Europe, the twelve member nations of the European Community (EC)
work steadily toward 1992 and their ideal of a single free market. In
Asia, the economic powerhouse Japan along with the tigers of the
Pacific rim hint at creating an East Asian Economic Grouping.2

1. Canada Will Join United States and Mexico in Negotiationsfor Free Trade Agreement,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 184 (Feb. 6, 1991). On February 5, 1991 President Bush announced
intentions to enter into trilateral negotiations that would link Canada, the United States, and
Mexico in "bold and far-reaching ways." Id. According to a joint communique issued by the
three countries, the goals of the negotiations are to eliminate obstacles to the flow of goods,
services, and investment; provide for intellectual property rights protection; and establish a fair
and expeditious dispute settlement mechanism. Id. If the negotiations result in the creation of
a free trade area, it would have a collective gross national product of $5.5 trillion, and contain
355 million customers. See Bruce Stokes, Yukon to Yucatan, 22 NAT'L J. 2324, 2325 (1990).
2. Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia's Prime Minister and architect of the plan, has said the
grouping would include the six members of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN): Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia. In addition,
the group would also include, inter alia, Viet Nam, Myanmar (Burma), Taiwan, Hong Kong,
South Korea, and Japan. David E. Sanger, Malaysia Trading Plan Seeks a Unified Voice,
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At first blush, the formation of these regional trade blocs seems
beneficial to international free trade. The NAFTA and post-1992 EC
may liberalize trade in some areas, and the Asian Grouping may create
some advantages for global trade.3 However, free trade purists are
suspicious of regional trading blocs since the 1930's era of trade protectionism.4 The February 5, 1991, free trade proposal can only serve
to heighten these worries. In contrast, free trade realists see these
free trade agreements as a viable means to successfully liberalize
trade. With the stalling of the Uruguay Round, 5 regional trade blocs
have become an increasingly attractive alternative to many nationstates.
The debate over the advantages of regional trade blocs versus the
advantages of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
is one of long standing.6 Free trade realists argue that the issues are
more complex than some free trade purists believe. Prior experience
regarding the destructive role of regional trade blocs is informative
but not dispositive. A more comprehensive analysis should examine
why nation-states are becoming more interested in the regional trade
bloc alternative. Moreover, one should ask whether regional trade

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1991, at D6, col. 1. The plan is intended to turn East Asia into a leading
exporting force and an 'investment haven," said Malaysia, so the region may stand a better
chance of competing against the European Community and North America. Id. The plan is still
very tentative. A number of the potential members have not even addressed the subject, and
Japan, whose membership is seen as crucial to a successful arrangement, has so far shown no
signs of interest. Id. However, Malaysia predicts that as the North American and European
trade zones become stronger and demand more concessions, Japan and the other East Asian
countries, will have no choice but to join the grouping to protect their trade positions. Lim S.
Hoon, Mahathir'sBrainchild Proves a Problem for Partners,FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991,
at 18.
3. Robert Kuttner, Bloc that Trade: The Second Marriageof Keynes and Adam Smith,
NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 1989, at 16.
4. Id. at 17-18. In the 1930s, bilateral agreements abounded. One of the more cynical uses
of bilateral agreements during this period was that of the Third Reich, whose economics minister,
Hjalmar Schacht, used bilateral trade deals as a deliberate adjunct to Nazi foreign policy. Id.
at 18.
5. On February 16, 1991, a GATT spokesman announced that "low-level" talks would resume
in the near future. The talks collapsed after a December meeting when the United States,
Canada, Argentina, Australia, and other grain exporters failed to persuade the European Community to cut agriculture subsidies. GATT Expects Talks on Trade to Resume, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1991, at 37, col. 5.
6. A more thorough examination of regional arrangements would differentiate among the
various types of non-multilateral arrangements. See infra note 60.
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blocs are necessarily harmful to global economic efficiency and liberalization. If not, is there a potential role for regional trade blocs within
the GATT system?
This article will first look at the history of the post-World War II
GATT system. Next, the article will focus on some specific weaknesses
in the GATT and look at how one particular regional trade bloc arrangement, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, provides its parties with greater economic efficiency. Finally, the article
will examine the value and potential role of regional trade blocs in
the GATT system. Two issues will be considered: 1) whether regional
trade blocs are trade creating or trade distorting; and 2) whether the
presence of regional trade blocs will hinder or facilitate global trade
liberalization.
II.

HISTORY: POST-WAR MULTILATERALISM AND THE

GATT

Post-World War II multilateralism, exercised through the GATT,
grew out of a desire not to repeat the global economic mistakes of
the past.7 The 1930s saw an abundance of trade restrictions and discrimination, and many of the restrictions were more politically than
economically motivated. 8 The effects of the restrictions were dramatic.
In the two years between 1930 and 1932, when the United States
imposed the Smoot-Hawley tariff, the volume in trade of manufactured
goods dropped by 40%. 9
After World War II, the Allies developed three institutions designed primarily to avoid the economic instability of the previous decade. 10 Of the three institutions, the GATT was most directly con-

7.

ALAN OXLEY, THE CHALLENGE OF FREE TRADE (1990).

8. William Diebold, Jr.,

The History and the Issues, in

BILATERALISM,

MUL-

TILATERALISM, AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 1, 9 (W. Diebold ed. 1988). See Kuttner,

supra note 3.
9. See OXLEY, supra note 7. Nevertheless, discrimination practiced by the United States
during the 1930s was minimal compared to that practiced by other nations. It was during this

period, in fact, that Roosevelt's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, promoted the use of bilateral
agreements containing most-favored-nations (MFN) clauses. The result was the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements program, authorized by Congress in the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. ANDREAS
F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 7, 10 (2d ed. 1983). By 1938 one-

third of product imports on which the United States had granted concessions came from countries
other than those to which the concessions had been made. MFN treatment was consistently
denied only to Germany during this period. See Diebold, supra note 8, at 9.
10. The institutions created were the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMP),
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Originally, the GATT was to be only
an interim and subordinate component of an International Trade Organization (ITO). However,

the ITO was seen as a potential threat to national autonomy and was never ratified by Congress.
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cerned with trade liberalization." The GATT's objective was to prevent
the spiralling falls in trade volume and economic growth caused by
pre-World War II discriminatory and restrictive trade practices. 2
The GATT was committed to the principle of non-discrimination
and enunciated this commitment in the most-favored-nation (MFN)
clause in Article I of the agreement. 13 Upon acceding to the GATT
and the MFN principle, the parties agreed that any reduction in tariffs
negotiated with one party would be extended to all other parties. 14
The MFN principle is the foundation of the GATT and is probably
the best illustration of the GATT's multilateral orientation. 15
After seven rounds of negotiations since 1948,16 the greatest success
of the GATT has been the reduction of tariffs.17 Specifically, trade in

manufactures among the industrialized nations has seen tariffs drop
from 40% in 1945 to 5% in the 1980s, and trade volume has multiplied
nine times. is In fact, tariffs have been lowered to such an extent that
tariff levels are no longer the main focus of GATT talks.19

Nothing to Lose but Its Chains: The ITO that Never Was, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1990, at 7.
The GATT remained to deal with tariff and trade issues. See OXLEY, supra note 7, at 4.
11. The United States adopted the GAT by executive order under the auspices of the
Reciprocal Trade Act of 1945. 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1945). Nevertheless, Congress has never
formally approved or disapproved the GATT. RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON, &
JOHN A. SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 383 (1986).
12. See OXLEY, supra note 7, at 4.
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article I, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such
duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with
importation or exportation, . . . any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id.
14. See OXLEY, supra note 7, at 6.
15. Comment, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and The Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
A Quiet Revolution, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 221 (1981).
16. See OXLEY, supra note 7, at 9.
17. The dates and locations of these talks, or "rounds," are as follows: 1947, Geneva,
Switzerland; 1948, Annecy, France; 1950, Torquay, England; 1956, Geneva, Switzerland; 1960-61,
"Dillon Round," Geneva, Switzerland; 1964-67, "Kennedy Round," Geneva, Switzerland; 1973-79,
"Tokyo Round," Geneva, Switzerland; 1986-present, "Uruguay Round," Geneva, Switzerland.
See Comment, supra note 15, at 222 n. 16. United States participation in these rounds has always
resulted from advance authorization by Congress. Id.
18. See OXLEY, supra note 7, at 9.
19. See Diebold, supra note 8, at 21.
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III.

STATUS

Quo:

FAILURES OF THE GATT; SUCCESSES OF FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS

A. Failures of the GATT
Notwithstanding the success of the GATT in reducing certain kinds
of tariffs, 2° many now see the GATT as having reached a point of
diminishing returns. 21 These "trade realists" argue that the ideal of
laissez-faire multilateralism is quixotic and point to the GATT's failures in dealing with a number of issues which still affect global trade
after four decades under the Agreement.
For example, talks have failed to eliminate tariffs for a number of
important products. GATT rules still do not apply to agriculture and
many types of manufactures: steel, automobiles, ships, and textiles.Many of these products come from industries too vital to their national
economies to risk inclusion in the arena of free competition. Therefore,
many of these industries will probably remain outside of GATT coverage in the near future. Moreover, the GATT has so far been unable
to usefully address emerging areas of international trade: services,
intellectual property and foreign investment.?3
Another significant failure of the GATT is in the area of non-tariff
trade barriers (NTBs). 24 The past fifteen years have witnessed a proliferation of NTBs in the form of voluntary export restraints, orderly
marketing arrangements, widespread subsidies, and other trade distorting practices.- Although many see these NTBs as a major cause
of the decline in trade growth since 1975, GATT talks have failed to
establish rules which deal effectively with them. 26 This failure is significant. In the United States alone, 21% of the total value of imports
is constrained by some kind of NTB. 7
20. The GATT now effectively applies to trade in manufactures among industrialized countries. These markets are generally open to all exports and imports; however, there are important
exceptions even within this sector. An example of such an exception is trade in motor vehicles,
which the United States and European community have practically removed from GATT coverage. See OXLEY, supra note 7, at 12.
21. Nothing to Lose but Its Chains: Joustingfor Advantage, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1990,
at 5.

22. See Diebold, supra, note 8, at 19.
23. Id. at 30.
24. Robert Kuttner, Guide to the GATT: The Tricky Road to Freer Trade; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 15, 1986, at 26. Although an effort was
made to deal with NTBs in the Tokyo Round, the resulting codes have had minimal effect. See
Diebold, supra note 8, at 19.
25. See Diebold, supra note 8, at 19.
26.

Id. at 8.

27. See OXLEY, supra note 7, at 12.
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Aside from lack of GATT coverage over many significant barriers
to free trade, the GATT structure suffers from ineffective enforcement
of the existing rules. 28 This is due, in part, to a cumbersome dispute
resolution procedure which suffers from too many opportunities for
delay.- The progress of a dispute resolution can be blocked at various
stages of the proceedings2 ° Pre-hearing negotiations between the disputants can be delayed by a party in interest, and, similarly, a single
party can postpone the establishment of a mediation panel by opposing
such in the GATT Council. 3 1 A single party may be able to block the
GATT Council's adoption of a resolution even after all the procedures
are completed.32 Moreover, GATT procedures are based upon a mediation and conciliation model, rather than an adjudicatory one; once a
resolution is adopted, there are no provisions in the GATT to make
the resolution binding upon the parties.w3
In addition, the limited enforcement of existing GATT rules is due,
in part, to the imprecision of the rules themselves. 3 A case in point
is the ambiguity of the GATT Subsidies Code.- The United States

28. There is a widespread but generally accepted unofficial departure from the letter of
the GATT. The GATT has been derisively called the "General Agreement to Talk and Talk,"
an epithet that reflects the belief of many parties that the "hands-off approach to trade is for
suckers." See supra note 21.
29. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 16:
Settling Disputes in the GATT: The Past, Present, and Future, 24 INrL LAW 519, 520 (1990).
The heart of GATT dispute settlement resides in Articles XXII and XXIII, GATT T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, and is supplemented by an agreement reached in the Tokyo Round - the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GATT' Doc. No.
L/4907. Id. at 521. GATTI process provides initially for negotiations, or "consultations," between
the disputants. Failing resolution, the complainant may request establishment of a mediation
panel by the GATT Council. This independent panel of experts, if established, would then hear
argument and make its recommendation to the GATT Council. The GATT Council would then
decide upon adoption and approval vel non of the panel report. Id. at 523.
30. Id. at 520, 523.
31. Id. at 523.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 520.
34. Richard 0. Cunningham, The Restatement as Prologue to Turmoil in the Law: A
Commentaryon the Restatement of U.S. InternationalTrade Law, 24 INrL LAW 315,317 (1990).
35. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT Subsidies Code), Geneva, 1979, GATT, 26th
Supp. B.I.S.D. 56 (1980). Congress adopted the GATT formulation in Title I of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671 (1979). The GATTI' allows restrictions - countervailing duties - to be placed on foreign subsidized imports which threaten domestic industry.
GATT Subsidies Code, part I, art. 4. Moreover, the GATT permits duties to protect domestic
industries against dumping. Further, temporary duties are allowed to generally protect against
strong competition. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XIX, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
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recently expanded its unfair trade laws beyond what many parties
felt the Subsidies Code allowed. However, due to the imprecision of
the Subsidies Code, the United States has generally been able to apply
7
its unfair trade laws without condemnation from the GATT Council.3
Although more a symptom than the disease itself, perhaps the
greatest harbinger of failure of the GATT is the loss of the United
States as its prime advocate. During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the
strength of the United States' position in the world market made
advocacy of free trade an obvious choice. However, the heavy imbalance in United States' foreign trade in the 1980s and early 1990s
resulted in a shift of focus from free trade to fair trade. 39 Reciprocity
is now the operative word in the lexicon of many United States policy
makers.40 The argument of GATT multilateralism - that free trade
encourages the most efficient use of resources - loses weight when
policy makers feel world trade is distorted by foreign government
intervention and abuse of market power. 41 Consequently, the GATT
has lost a large percentage of support it once had from the United
States.
B.

Successes of Free Trade Agreements

Given the failures of the GATT in dealing with many issues, it is
not surprising that individual nations look to regional trade blocs to
fill the need for stability and control. The GATT itself has always
recognized the legitimacy of certain kinds of regional trade arrange-

36. See Cunningham, supra note 34, at 317, 319. The United States began to take aggressive
action against alleged unfair trade following complaints from United States industries and labor
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Id. at 319. Some examples of expansion of the unfair trade laws
include: the 1970s extension of countervailing duty law beyond the accepted realm of export
subsidies to the broader and controversial area of domestic or production subsidies; the 1974
expansion of antidumping law beyond price discrimination to include any type of below-cost
selling; the 1974 creation of a new cause of action against non-market economies for "market
disruption;" and the 1979 extension of countervailing duty law to cover a wide range of government benefits. Id. at 320.
37. The recent GATT ruling condemning aspects of § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
U.S.C.A. § 1337) may portend a new willingness to challenge United States unfair trade practice
laws. Id. at 321 n.20.
38. Id. at 318. Some argue that the United States is abandoning its purist free trade views,
not just out of frustration with multilateral negotiations, but also because of a fundamental loss
of competiveness. Id. at 319.
39. See Diebold, supra note 8, at 21.
40. Id. at 22.
41. Id. at 23.
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ments. 42 But in recent years, there are new signs that GATT nations
are becoming weary with the GATT and are willing to go beyond
GATT allowances in creating regional trade agreements.4 An examination of the successes of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement- (FTA) provides some explanations.
The FTA took effect on January 1, 198945 and was intended to deal

with a number of issues unresolved in GATT rounds.46 One of the
FTA's major achievements was tariff elimination. 47 Under the GATT,
United States' tariffs on Canadian imports averaged 3.3% and Canadian tariffs of United States imports averaged 9.9%. In contrast, the
FTA eliminates all tariffs within ten years.Another FTA achievement was the establishment of a framework
of rules governing services. 49 Under the GATT, trade in services went
largely unaddressed.- ° However, the FTA provides a structure of
rights and obligations regarding national treatment, establishment,
licensing, and certification procedures. Moreover, the FTA promotes
the liberalization of some service sectors.51

42. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
194. Article XXIV permits regional arrangements (customs unions and free trade areas) if the
following conditions are satisfied. First, the arrangement must be designed to facilitate trade
between constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties
with such territories. Second, the arrangement must cover substantially all the trade between
the constituent territories. Third, if the arrangement is to be implemented in intervals, there
must be a plan and schedule to complete the transition within a reasonable time. Finally, the
trade restrictions maintained by the arrangement, or the arrangement's parties, cannot on the
whole be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding restrictions extant before the arrangement. Id. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, What the GATT Says (Or Does Not Say), in
BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 55, 59-60 (W.
Diebold Jr., ed. 1988).
43. What Bilateral Deals Mean for Trade, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1988, at 63.
44. H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988), reprintedin 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
45. See also United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, §§
401-10, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988).
46. Jeffrey J. Schott, The Free Trade Agreement: A U.S. Assessment, in THE CANADAUNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT 1, 2 (1988). Article 102 of
the FTA delineates five specific objectives: to eliminate trade barriers to goods and services;
to promote fair trade; to improve the investment climate; to establish joint procedures to administer the FTA and to resolve disputes, and to promote further cooperation on trade and investment
issues both bilaterally and multilaterally. Id.
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 29.
50. See Kuttner, supra note 24, at 26.
51. See Schott, supra note 46, at 29.
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In the area of dispute resolution, the FTA system provides distinct
advantages over the awkward GATT mechanism. 52 The FTA establishes a Canada-United States Commission composed of officials from
both countries to supervise the operation of the FTA and to resolve
any disputes.53 Moreover, the FTA establishes a bi-national panel specifically to hear disputes concerning countervailing duties and illegal
government subsidies.M In addition, the FTA makes arbitration compulsory and binding upon both parties for disputes arising from application or interpretation of the Agreement.- The authoritative character of the FTA's dispute resolution system contrasts sharply with the
GATT mechanism, which seeks to mediate and conciliate.Although the FTA's specific achievements are easily recognized,
experts predict long-term benefits for both Canada and the United
States' economies. 57 An overall reduction in trade restrictions allows
larger economies of scale and greater rationalization of industries and,
thereby, increases output and employmentM Moreover, an efficient
and authoritative dispute resolution system provides stability and decreases trade disputes which could balloon into destructive conflicts
69
in trade policy.
The FTA is not representative of every viable type of regional
trade bloc. 6° Nevertheless, in comparison with the GATT, the FTA
presents many illustrations of how regional trade blocs can successfully
deal with contemporary trade issues. Examination of the FTA's suc-

52. See generally J.G. Castel, The Settlement of Disputes Under the 1988 Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 83 A.J.I.L. 118 (1989).
53. See Schott, supra note 46, at 28.
54. Id.
55. Thus, the FTA sets up a two-track mechanism for dispute resolution. The first mentioned
in the text is a general dispute settlement procedure, which covers most aspects of the FTA.
It not only serves to expeditiously resolve disputes, but also to attempt to preempt potential
disputes. Id. at 30. The second track deals with the limited area of disputes over subsidies,
countervailing duties, and antidumping matters. Id.
56. Murray G. Smith, What Is at Stake?, in BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND
CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 69, 97 (W. Diebold ed. 1988). See also Robert E. Hudec, The
FTA Provisions on Dispute Settlement: The Lessons of the GATT Experience, in UNDERSTANDING THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 31 (D. McRae & D. Steger eds. 1988).
57. See Schott, supra note 46, at 34.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Regional arrangements may exist not only in the form of free trade areas such as the
FTA, but also as customs unions, an example of which would be the European Community.
The main difference is that in the former, each member maintains control over commercial
policy for, and trade negotiations with, third countries. In the latter, this control is ceded to a
supranational mechanism. See Smith, supra note 56, at 85.
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cesses in handling some difficult trade issues provides an understanding of why nation-states see regional trade blocs as a feasible alternative to the GATT.
IV.

ANALYSIS: THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF

REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS

There are conflicting views about the long-term implications of the
emerging regional trade blocs. Are free trade purists correct in holding
that regional trade blocs will, by their very nature, result in breaking
up the global trading system? Are regional trade agreements like the
FTA a movement down the slippery slope of 1930s-type protectionism?
To answer these questions, one must consider two issues: 1) whether
regional trade blocs will create or distort global trade; and 2) whether
regional trade blocs will hinder or facilitate global trade liberalization.61
A. Implicationsfor Global Efficiency
Free trade purists argue that regional trade blocs are discriminatory, even where the regional trade agreements do not raise new
collective barriers to trade.- This discrimination, they argue, undermines the spirit of the GATT and damages the economic efficiency
the GATT was designed to foster.6 Thus, the free trade purists contend that regional trade blocs distort global trade flow and reduce
global economic efficiency.4
While it is true that regional trade blocs violate the MFN princiPle,65 it is not so clear that they injure global economic efficiency.-

Free trade realists argue that the free trade blocs' removal of trade
barriers among partners creates economies of scale at the industry
level and economies of scope at the level of individual firms. Economies
of scale and scope allow for increased rationalization of production,

61.

Id. at 88.

62. See Kuttner, supra note 24, at 26.
63. See Smith, supra note 56, at 88.
64. This argument can be illustrated with an example. Suppose Country A produces crude
oil, but at a very low level of efficiency. Country B is a net consumer of crude oil. Country A
enters into a regional arrangement with Country B whereby all barriers to trade between the
two are eliminated, although barriers to outside trade for the two remain at 10%. Even if there
are outside countries which produce crude oil more efficiently than Country A, Country B will
purchase its crude oil from Country A as long as Country A can produce (and hence, sell) it
for less than 10% greater than outsiders can. Thus, the argument goes, regional arrangements
divert trade and may foster inefficient use of resources.
65. See Kuttner, supra note 24, at 26.
66. See Smith, supra note 56, at 88.
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which in turn leads to efficient use of resources.

67 Free

trade realists

contend this economic efficiency will result in greater global trade
volume, which benefits outsiders as well as regional trade partners.
This "spill-over" of net benefits to outsiders, the realists argue, may
very well outweigh the net costs of the original diversion of trade.6
Viewed in this light, regional trade blocs may support the GATT by
creating global trade and by facilitating global trade liberalization.
B.

Implications for Global Trade Liberalization

Free trade purists argue that regional trade partners tend to
negotiate as a bloc in multilateral trade talks, rather than as individual
nations. Thus, other nations are forced to develop regional trade arrangements of their own or risk the loss of bargaining power. Ultimately, free trade purists argue, the multilateral trade system dissolves into a few intransigent economic fortresses.69
Although regional arrangements, such as the Canada-United States
FTA, create preferences among regional trade partners, free trade
realists argue that these preferences are unlikely to erode the multilateral trade system embodied in the GATT. 70 First, the extreme interdependence of nations remains despite current trade impasses.71 Second, regional trade blocs may actually encourage other countries to
liberalize.- Rather than using the "stick" of unilateral retaliation for
unsatisfactory trade barriers, an outside country is presented with
the "carrot" of membership if it liberalizes. Such an inducement, free
trade realists argue, is preferable to the application of negative sanctions. 73 Using the "carrot" approach, the original regional trade blocs

67. Id.
68. The magnitude of this spill-over effect is determined by the scope of the agreement.
The question of the trade creating qualities of a particular agreement necessarily turns on the
issue of whether the agreement constitutes a customs union, or a free trade agreement. See
supra note 60 and accompanying text. Smith argues that customs unions are less likely to have
a trade creating effect, and are thus more likely to foster global inefficiency. See Smith, supra
note 56, at 89.
69. A worst-case scenario portrays the multilateral world devolving into a tripolar economic
and political environment, comprised of a North American bloc dominated by the United States,
a European bloc, dominated by Germany, and a Pacific bloc, dominated by Japan. Political
scientists have theorized that tripolar systems are the most unstable power configuration. C.
Fred Bergsten, The World Economy After the Cold War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1990,
at 96, 98.
70. See Smith, supra note 56, at 90.
71. See Kuttner, supra note 24, at 17.
72. See Smith, supra note 56, at 90.
73. Id. at 91.
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could expand and merge to encompass more and more economies and,
theoretically, result in an entire global economic system.74
Furthermore, regional trade blocs serve as experimental models
for the GATT by pioneering approaches to contemporary trade issues
such as barriers to trade in agriculture, intellectual property and services. 7r Thus, regional trade blocs serve as "laboratories" to experiment with new rules. Where the inertia of the GATT rounds hinders
innovation, regional trade blocs provide opportunities for experimentation. Successful procedures are then better received for implementation in the GATT. Such a system brings to mind the United States'
federal and state system, where individual states often pioneer new
laws which are then taken up by other states and, ultimately, by the
federal system.
V.

CONCLUSION: BENEFITS OF A MIXED-SYSTEM

Global trade has never been freer than it has been since World
War II, and few would deny that the primary reasons are the Bretton
Woods institutions set up in 1947. The GATT provided the world with
dramatic liberalization of trade practices between nations and has
forestalled, so far, any return to 1930s-type protectionism.76 However,
today many view the GATT multilateral trade system as overly cumbersome and largely incapable of dealing with the most important
contemporary trade issues. Thus, the frustration caused by GATT
inadequacies results in a search for viable regional alternatives.
Although many free trade purists see the new willingness to operate outside the GATT as presaging a future of global fragmentation
and instability, 77 there is a more benign alternative. The emergence
of regional trade blocs may in fact bolster the GATT rather than
dismember it.78 Trade liberalization presents the GATT with benefits,
even if the liberalization is obtained on a regional basis.
The apparent trend towards regional trade blocs suggests that
nation-states recognize a viable alternative to unadulterated laissez-

74.
hope ...

United States Secretary of State George Schultz explained that "[the United States']
is that the [FTA's] example of greater liberalization -

and the recognition that the

United States can pursue another course - will help motivate a larger group of nations to
tackle the job of expanding trade on a global basis." Id.
75. William Diebold, Jr., The New Bilateralism?, in BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM,
AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 128, 179 (W. Diebold ed. 1988).
76. See supra note 21, at 6.
77. See Bergsten, supra note 69.
78. See Kuttner, supra note 3, at 18.
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faire multilateralism. The success of the Canada-United States FTA
may motivate other countries to seek similar solutions. 79 If so, there

is reason to hope that the cause of global trade liberalization will be
strengthened, rather than weakened, by a measure of bilateralism
and, possibly plurilateralism, within the GATT multilateral trade system.
John P. Byrley

79. Of course, the FTA has already moved Mexico to attempt membership in a North
American free trade area. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying texts.
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